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        hat does the law of armed conflict (LOAC) say about detention in 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC)? Does the legal regime do any-
thing in the way of seriously regulating the grounds for detention—setting 
forth who may be confined and for what status or behavior? And does 
LOAC provide an affirmative source of authority that empowers belliger-
ents to engage in detention when they otherwise could not? These questions 
have recently become more salient due to litigation working its way up 
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through the United Kingdom’s court system,1 and due to a recent General 
Comment by the UN Human Rights Committee.2  
The British judiciary and the UN body are now in alignment suggesting 
that laws of war do not regulate the grounds for detention in NIACs—
though the legal implications they draw from that conclusion may be dif-
ferent. According to the British ruling, it will be more difficult for UK 
forces to conduct some military operations abroad without clear Security 
Council authority to engage in detention or the local government’s authori-
zation of the detention. And according to the UN human rights body, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) should fill 
the legal void in regulating detention in a NIAC. As Shaheed Fatima ex-
plains, the General Comment “appears to indicate that [the UN Human 
Rights Committee] does not regard [International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL)] in NIAC as including rules regarding arbitrary detention—and, 
therefore, that the only source of protection against arbitrary detention in 
NIAC is [international human rights law].”3  
Who is to say whether the British Court wanted to incentivize Her 
Majesty’s Government to operate under the Security Council or with great-
er consent from local authorities, and whether the UN Human Rights 
Committee wanted to elevate the regulatory role of human rights in 
warzones? Such questions are not my concern here, and their answers may 
be beyond the province of any of us. That said, I do argue that both the 
Court’s and the Committee’s account of LOAC rules in NIAC are not well 
                                                                                                                      
1. Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369, [273], available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/mohammed-v-mod.pdf 
[hereinafter Mohammed]. 
2. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Article 9: Liberty and 
Security of Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014), available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CC
PR/C/GC/35&Lang=en.   
3. Shaheed Fatima, UN HRC’s General Comment on the Right to Liberty and Security: A 
Missed Opportunity? (Part Two), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://just securi-
ty.org/17596/human-rights-committees-general-comment-no-35-security-detention/. See 
also Jonathan Horowitz, Clarity or Confusion? General Comment 35 and Security Detention, JUST 
SECURITY (Nov. 21, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/17702/clarity-confusion-general-
comment-35-security-detention/ (“Committee is likely saying that IHL ‘may be’ relevant 
depending on what type of armed conflict you are in.”). But see Gabor Rona, Is There a Way 
Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 32, 53 (2015), available at http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? arti-
cle=1001&context=ils (suggesting, wrongly in my view, that “the Comment does not ad-












founded, and that their legal conclusions risk unintended and perverse con-
sequences.  
To get to that analysis, it is important first to interrogate the proposi-
tion that the laws of war do not regulate the grounds for detention in NI-
ACs. In the balance of this article, I focus on the UK High Court decision 
in Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defense, which has provided the most ex-
tensive analysis of the issue to date. In that case, the High Court held that 
the long-term detention of a suspected Taliban commander by British 
forces was unlawful—and, by extension, so was the general long-term de-
tention policy of British forces in Afghanistan. That judicial opinion de-
servedly received accolades from international law experts for its extraordi-
narily informed and thoughtful analysis across a range of challenging inter-
national legal questions. I agree with a core part of the High Court’s ulti-
mate holding, but I respectfully disagree with a significant part of the ra-
tionale that the Court used as a basis for reaching that result. The judgment 
is now under consideration by the UK Court of Appeal.  
I should note an important aside before proceeding. The British gov-
ernment relied on a law review article I wrote in its briefs submitted to the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal.4 I accordingly take very seriously the 
task in this article to explain why I believe that law review article is con-
sistent with the High Court’s holding, but contradicts a significant part of 
the Court’s chosen rationale.  
 
II. THE MOHAMMED FRAMEWORK 
 
The High Court advanced two propositions:  
 
Proposition 1: (No) Authorization 
LOAC does not provide authorization (the source of legal authori-
ty) for a power to detain in non-international armed conflicts. 
 
Proposition 2: (No) Regulation  
LOAC has nothing to say about the grounds on which States may 
preventively detain particular individuals in non-international armed 
conflicts (e.g., whether States may lawfully detain individuals who 
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pose an imperative security threat) or what procedures should apply 
to detention in non-international armed conflicts. 
 
With respect to the first proposition, the Court concluded that because 
LOAC does not authorize detention in NIACs, the government needed to 
secure authorization either from Afghan domestic law or a Security Council 
resolution.  
Part of the basis for the first proposition, according to Mr. Justice Leg-
gatt, was the second proposition. That is, proof that LOAC does not au-
thorize detention in NIACs is that neither treaty law nor customary inter-
national law contain any rules setting forth who may be detained and ac-
cording to what procedures. On this view, there is a complete gap in 
LOAC when it comes to those substantive and procedural determinations. 
That is, we might as well be talking about WTO law. The WTO does not 
authorize or prohibit detention in NIACs, and has nothing to say about the 
substantive and procedural basis for detention. 
I agree with the first proposition. I disagree with the second. And, in-
deed, the second proposition is unnecessary. The first proposition can 
stand without it.  
 
III. AUTHORIZATION TO DETAIN 
 
Mr. Justice Leggatt correctly held that LOAC does not provide authoriza-
tion to detain in NIACs, and thus, in this particular case, “the only poten-
tial sources of a power to detain are considered to be the host State’s own 
domestic law (i.e. in this case the domestic law of Afghanistan) and [UN 
Security Council Resolutions].”5  
Despite the government’s reference to my 2009 law review article in its 
brief, that article is consistent with the Mohammed judgment’s first proposi-
tion. A major point in my article is that LOAC does not prohibit (it allows 
for) detention of civilians who pose a security threat in NIACs. And the 
High Court held that LOAC does not authorize (nor does it prohibit) de-
tention in NIACs. As Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande helpful-
                                                                                                                      
5. Mohammed, supra note 1, ¶ 257. Notably, if UN Security Council Resolutions suffice, 
one might posit that the UN Charter or the use of force regime more generally authorize 












ly explain, all those claims are compatible.6 Indeed, Hill-Cawthorne and 
Akande explain, correctly in my view, the relationship between the High 
Court’s first proposition and the claims in my 2009 article: 
 
[To] argue that IHL does not create a legal basis to intern in NIACs is not 
inconsistent with Professor Goodman’s view. IHL does not restrict States 
with regard to detention in NIACs anymore than it does restrict their 
ability to detain in [international armed conflicts]. States are not prohibit-
ed from detaining in NIACs, and, in that sense, are therefore permitted 
by IHL to detain. IHL simply does not itself provide a legal basis to do 
so. That legal basis must be found elsewhere. 
 
As Hill-Cawthorne and Akande explain more broadly in their excellent 
analysis, it is routine for areas of law to regulate a practice without provid-
ing a source of authority for that practice. By way of example, international 
human rights law restricts the grounds upon which a State may detain an 
individual and imposes procedural safeguards when a State does so. But 
international human rights, as a body of law, does not provide the source 
of authority to detain. If anything, the reverse is true. International human 
rights law may require a State to have a basis in domestic law or other legal 
authority as a predicate for detaining people.   
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Leggatt goes further (in dicta) by as-
serting that LOAC does authorize detention in international armed conflict. 
The High Court’s judgment invokes the wording of Article 21 of the Pris-
oners of War Convention (POW Convention)7 (and by implicit reference 
presumably similar language in Articles 41–43 and 78 of the Civilians Con-
vention8).  
It is not clear, however, that LOAC even provides the source of au-
thority for States to detain in international armed conflicts. Instead, LOAC 
may be better understood as a generally prohibitory legal regime—
consisting of rules and prohibitions. Accordingly, it is not as though States 
                                                                                                                      
6. Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Deten-
tion in Non-International Armed Conflicts?, EJIL TALK (May 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org 
/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts/. 
7. Mohammed, supra note 1, ¶ 242. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War art. 21, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
8. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 














needed the 1949 Geneva Conventions to have the authority to detain or 
kill in armed conflict. Consider, for example, Derek Jinks’ exposition of the 
general structure of the jus in bello regime: 
 
IHL should not be understood as conferring authority on states in the 
strong sense. IHL rules, in the main, are prohibitory. As discussed at the 
outset of this Chapter, they establish a floor of humanitarian protection—
crafted in light of the vulnerable circumstances common to organized 
hostilities. 
 
. . . .   
 
An important feature of the IHL regime makes clear that it does not pro-
vide affirmative authorization to kill, capture, or detain. IHL is, in one 
important respect, a second-order legal regime—governing only the con-
duct of hostilities.9 
 
Other commentators have also explained exceedingly well why LOAC does 
not authorize the power to detain, though they restrict their claim to the 
power as manifested in NIACs.10  
 
IV. REGULATION OF (SECURITY-BASED) DETENTION 
 
The High Court may have derived its understanding that LOAC fails to 
regulate detention in NIACs from the petitioners in the case. The Claim-
ants represented by Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) told the Court that in 
NIACs “IHL does not supply any answers” to substantive questions of 
who can be detained and procedural questions of what safeguards should 
apply.11 The Claimants also stated: 
 
[F]or an implicit legal basis to detain or intern to exist . . . it should at 
least be possible to deduce from it the grounds and procedures in accord-
ance with which a person can be deprived of his or her liberty. However, 
                                                                                                                      
9. Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 656, 666–69 (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). See also Derek Jinks, Does IHL Authorize Detention in 
NIACs?, JUST SECURITY (May 5, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/10144/ihl-authorize-
detention-niacs/. 
10. See, e.g., Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra note 6.  
11. PIL Claimants’ Memorial, ¶ 12, Annex A, Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, 












neither [Common Article 3 (CA3)] nor [Additional Protocol II (AP2)] de-
fines who can be interned or detained in [NIAC], for what reasons, in accordance 
with what procedures, and for how long.12 
 
In other words, LOAC is as good as WTO or space law. That is, 
LOAC (like WTO and like space law) includes no authority to detain as 
clearly evidenced by this area of law’s purported silence on the conditions 
under which detention in NIAC can be exercised.  
The Court accepted this argument. As for treaty law, Mr. Justice Leg-
gatt stated in language that closely tracks the above text from the Claimant: 
 
I do not see how CA3 or AP2 could possibly have been intended to pro-
vide a power to detain, nor how they could reasonably be interpreted as 
doing so, unless it was possible to identify the scope of the power. How-
ever, neither CA3 nor AP2 specifies who may be detained, on what grounds, in 
accordance with what procedures, or for how long.13  
 
Mr. Justice Leggatt extended that reasoning to his analysis of customary 
international law,14 and ended with the two propositions: “I have conclud-
ed that in its present stage of development IHL does not provide a legal 
power to detain nor does it specify grounds on which detention is permitted nor proce-
dures governing detention.”15  
The second proposition—especially in its absolutist form that LOAC 
essentially provides “no answers” to grounds and procedures for deten-
tion—is not well supported. 
First, the very structure of LOAC provides an answer to the outer 
boundaries of permissible State actions in NIAC. That was a major claim in 
my 2009 law review article, namely, the proposition that State actions, 
which are permitted by LOAC in international armed conflicts, are general-
ly permitted by LOAC in NIACs. At a fundamental level, LOAC in  
 
international armed conflict—and the Fourth Geneva Convention in par-
ticular—is directly relevant because it establishes an outer boundary of 
permissive action. States have accepted more exacting obligations under 
IHL in international than in non-international armed conflicts. That is, 
                                                                                                                      
12. Id., ¶ 8, Annex A (quoting ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: LAWFUL INTERN-
MENT IN ARMED CONFLICT (2013) (emphasis added). 
13. Mohammed, supra note 1, ¶ 246 (emphasis added). 
14. Id., ¶¶ 258, 261. 












IHL is uniformly less restrictive in internal armed conflicts than in inter-
national armed conflicts. Accordingly, if [S]tates [are lawfully able] to en-
gage in particular practices in an international armed conflict (e.g., target-
ing direct participants in hostilities), they a fortiori [can lawfully] under-
take those practices in non-international conflict. Simply put, whatever is 
permitted in international armed conflict is permitted in non-international 
armed conflict.16  
 
In short, LOAC rules regulating international armed conflict are, with 
only few or no exceptions,17 more restrictive across the board than those 
regulating States in fighting an internal conflict (where States’ sovereignty is 
at its zenith). It is difficult to conceive of an action that a State would not 
be permitted to take in a NIAC that would suddenly become permissible if 
the conflict were transformed into an international armed conflict. Put an-
other way: what victim of armed conflict would prefer Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II rather than the full protections of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I? As a further illustration, consider 
how the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia, dating back to its first judgment in Tadic, rests on this basic 
logic. Prosecutors in The Hague have fought mightily for the rules of inter-
national armed conflict rather than NIAC to apply to the behavior of de-
fendants, because the former body of rules imposes a greater set of prohi-
bitions. There was essentially never a thought that a more permissive re-
gime would apply in international armed conflict.  
Additional evidence that LOAC permits the detention of security 
threats in NIACs is found in State practice and, indirectly, through stand-
ard setting procedures. As the ICRC reported in 2014, “‘imperative reasons 
of security’ as the minimum legal standard . . . is already in wide use when 
States resort to non-criminal detention for security reasons.”18 Several im-
portant States through the Copenhagen Process on the Handling of De-
                                                                                                                      
16. Goodman, supra note 4. I have altered the wording, as indicated by square brack-
ets, to use the same terminology in our present discussion. 
17. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICT 68–69 (2012). 
18. International Committee of the Red Cross, Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules 
and Challenges (Opinion Paper, Nov. 2014), available at https://www.icrc.org/en/ down-
load/file/1980/security-detention-position-paper-icrc-11-2014.pdf. See also Knut Dör-
mann, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 347, 356 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris 












tainees in International Military Operations—including “specially affected” 
States, a significant category for customary international law purposes—
accepted such delimitations on detention in NIACs.19 Of course, the Co-
penhagen Principles and Guidelines state explicitly that they “should not be 
taken as evidence that States regard the practice as required out of a sense 
of legal obligation.” Our focus, for the moment, however, is not on what is 
required by international law, but what is permitted. The Copenhagen Pro-
cess demonstrates that these States all presumably accept that security-
based detention in NIACs is legally permissible. It is no wonder that a 2008 
Report by a group of experts convened by the ICRC and Chatham House 
“quite easily” reached a consensus that in NIACs “parties to a conflict may 
capture persons deemed to pose a serious security threat and that such per-
sons may be interned as long as they continue to pose a threat.”20 
So far we have discussed the permissive boundaries of detention in 
NIACs but what about limitations on States in these contexts? LOAC also 
imposes a set of important constraints on the grounds for detention in in-
ternal armed conflict. On one extreme, some commentators suggest that 
LOAC has no limitations whatsoever on detention in NIACs, including no 
rules prohibiting arbitrary confinement.21 That proposition is difficult to 
sustain (and the correct answer must be, at least, more complicated).  
Consider first the text of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conven-
tions. Under the framework set forth in Common Article 3, the power to 
detain is subject to a number of substantive constraints. First, individuals 
cannot be detained on discriminatory grounds such as “race, color, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.”22 Second, parties 
                                                                                                                      
19. The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations: 
Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1368 
(2012), available at http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politicsand-
diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf. 
20.  Chatham House & International Committee of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting on 
Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-international Armed Conflict, 91 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 859, 863 (2009), available at https://www.icrc 
.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-876-expert-meeting.pdf [hereinafter Chatham House & 
ICRC Expert Meeting Report]. 
21. DEBUF, supra  note 12, at 451 (claiming that LOAC is “utterly silent” on this top-
ic); Kevin Jon Heller, Responding to Ryan Goodman About Serdar Mohammed, OPINIO JURIS 
(Feb. 5, 2015), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/05/goodman-serdar-moha 
mmed-part/; Kevin Jon Heller, The Use and Abuse of Analogy in IHL, in THEORETICAL 
BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens Ohlin, ed., forthcoming 
2015). 












to a conflict are prohibited from taking hostages. According to the ICRC 
Commentary, that prohibition is based on a fundamental principle of justice:  
 
The taking of hostages, like reprisals, to which it is often the prelude, is 
contrary to the modern idea of justice in that it is based on the principle 
of collective responsibility for crime. Both strike at persons who are in-
nocent of the crime which it is intended to prevent or punish.23 
 
In other words, if a person does not bear individual responsibility for a 
security threat to the State, he should not be deprived of his liberty, even if 
confining him could prevent the threat from materializing. Third, Common 
Article 3 prohibits the passing of a sentence without affording fundamental 
judicial guarantees, and that provision implicitly restricts the use of admin-
istrative detention for punitive purposes.  
Fourth, unlawful confinement is prohibited by a broad-based obliga-
tion under Common Article 3, namely, that those placed hors de combat 
“shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”24 Would it be humane to 
remove an individual from her family, physically seclude her, and hold her 
in long-term confinement even though she represents no direct security 
threat to a belligerent? That deprivation of liberty and variations of it 
would surely constitute inhumane treatment. And, indeed, the ICRC’s anal-
ysis of customary international humanitarian law concludes that, as a matter 
of treaty law, “arbitrary deprivation of liberty is not compatible” with hu-
mane treatment under Common Article 3.25 In other words, like fair trial 
rights under Common Article 3, this is another domain in which abstract 
legal protections in LOAC are defined, in part, by directly relevant human 
rights standards. 
International authorities also suggest that unlawful confinement is pro-
hibited in non-international armed conflict as a matter of customary inter-
national law. In considering the practices of armed opposition groups in 
                                                                                                                      
23. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR 39 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). 
24. Civilians Convention, supra note 8, art. 3(1). 
25. [1] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 99 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/cust 
omary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule99. Cf. Joanna Dingwall, Unlawful Confinement as a War 
Crime, 9 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 133 (2004) (arguing that Common 
Article 3 prohibits unlawful confinement as a form of “cruel treatment”). The overriding 
obligation of humane treatment is arguably even more clearly and more directly relevant to 












Colombia’s civil war, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
stated: “International humanitarian law also prohibits the detention or in-
ternment of civilians except where necessary for imperative reasons of se-
curity.”26 Liesbeth Zegveld also reports that the UN Commission on Hu-
man Rights drew from LOAC applicable to international armed conflicts in 
demanding armed opposition groups refrain from arbitrary detention in 
Afghanistan (1993) and in the Sudan (1995).27 In addition, Article 3 of the 
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards proscribes the 
disappearance of individuals, “including their abduction or unacknowl-
edged detention.”28 And Article 11 of the Turku Declaration includes an 
implicit restriction on substantive grounds for detention: “If it is consid-
ered necessary for imperative reasons of security to subject any person to 
assigned residence, internment or administrative detention, such decisions 
shall be subject to a regular procedure prescribed by law . . . .29 Similarly, 
the ICRC, in a 2012–13 Background Paper on detention, reported: “In 
terms of grounds for internment, the ICRC, along with a growing interna-
tional consensus of experts considers that ‘imperative reasons of security’ is 
an appropriate standard for internment in NIAC.”30  
On what theory did the High Court base its notion that LOAC in-
cludes no regulation whatsoever of grounds for detention? The theory of 
                                                                                                                      
26. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Special Report on the Hu-
man Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev. I, ¶ 122 (1999); id., 
¶¶ 128–29 (“The Commission notes that the vast majority of these detentions relating to 
the election boycott constituted breaches of international humanitarian law. The armed 
dissident groups repeatedly captured and held civilians, although they did not pose any 
direct threat to the military operations of the guerrillas . . . . Armed dissident groups are 
also responsible for arbitrary deprivations of liberty carried out against civilians, outside of 
the context of the elections.”). 
27. See LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION 
GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–66 (2002). 
28. Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (Turku Declaration), art. 3, 
U.N. Doc. fJCN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (1990). 
29. Id., art. 11. 
30. International Committee for the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for 
Persons Deprived of their Liberty in relation to Non-International Armed Conflict, Re-
gional Consultations 2012–13 Background Paper 3 (2013), available at https://www.icrc 
.org/eng/assets/files/2013/strengthening-legal-protection-detention-consultations-2012-
2013-icrc.pdf. See also Chatham House & ICRC Expert Meeting Report, supra note 20, at 
864 (“The most recurrent ground invoked for internment in NIAC—and probably the 
only permissible ground—is that of ‘imperative reasons of security’”). Cf. Jelena Pejic, 
Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment /Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and 












the High Court (and the Claimants) is that States wanted to avoid recogniz-
ing the authority of non-State actors such as insurgents to detain. But as 
Hill-Cawthorne and Akande describe so well: “There is good authority for 
the view that regulation of conduct by international law does not imply au-
thorization of that conduct or acceptance of the legality of that conduct.”31 
Indeed, the High Court (and the Claimants themselves) accepted this logic. 
That is, the Court (and Claimants) applied that logic in reasoning why 
LOAC’s regulation of the conditions of confinement should not be equated 
with an authority to detain. In short, it is clear that regulation of an action 
(especially a practically inevitable action in war) does not translate into 
recognition of the right or authority to engage in that act.  
By way of another example, consider trials in NIACs. If the High 
Court were correct about bestowing legitimacy or legality on the actions of 
non-State actors, LOAC would not recognize the prospect of such parties 
holding a trial and imposing criminal sentences. Yet Common Article 3 
does just that. Like detention, the legal system recognizes the fact that non-
State actors will engage in such actions and LOAC thus creates a set of le-
gal rules to regulate such procedures. As Sandesh Sivakumaran, one of the 
leading legal authorities on NIACs, wrote:  
 
[I]t is not so much about a right to intern as it is about the need to regu-
late the existing practice of parties to non-international armed con-
flicts. . . . Indeed, a number of armed groups have enacted rules on of-
fences, arrest, and trial, and these could and should be developed to in-
clude the modalities of internment.32 
 
It is unclear, but the High Court’s theory for Proposition 2 may also 
rest on a notion that the LOAC detention scheme in international conflicts 
includes only status-based detention with corresponding privileges such as 
for POWs. The PIL Claimants stated: “Perhaps the most important reason 
for this is that . . . the internment powers in the Geneva Conventions are 
based on status (e.g., prisoners of war) and those categories (with their cor-
responding privileges) have no equivalence in NIAC-IHL.”33 However, 
LOAC in international armed conflict also includes detention without such 
status categories or privileges under the Civilians Convention (covering 
                                                                                                                      
31. Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra note 6. 
32. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 17. 
33. See also PIL Claimants’ Memorial, supra note 11, ¶ 10, Annex A; Mohammed, supra 












individuals who pose a security threat, saboteurs, and the like). And, it is 
now widely recognized that LOAC in NIACs does include status-based 
categories such as combatants and civilians, which are potentially relevant 
for detention.34  
The explanation that States avoided the application of LOAC to deten-
tion in NIACs because they wanted to avoid recognizing the rights of non-
State actors also suffers a problem with respect to contemporary practice. 
If it were true that regulation of detention in NIACs implies recognition of 
non-State actors’ authority to detain, what is the explanation for why so 
many States have since then explicitly endorsed such regulations (such as 
the Copenhagen Process)? Have powerful military States suddenly agreed 
to recognize non-State actors’ authority to detain? Have these governments 
decided to wipe out their ability to pass domestic legislation to prohibit 
forcible abduction and detention by insurgents? Of course not. It is be-
cause the connection between acceptance of restrictions on detention and 
recognition of the authority to detain does not exist in the way the High 
Court believed.  
At bottom, the most important point is that these debates about prop-
osition 2 are irrelevant for the decision at hand in Mohammed. Proposition 1 
is sufficient and well-established without it. There may also be a middle 
ground here that avoids some of these debates. One might conclude that 
the rules regulating detention in NIACs, although they do exist, are rela-
tively rudimentary. The British courts could conclude that an authority to 
detain cannot exist with such a limited set of rules to define its scope. But 
the notion that no such rules exist is mistaken, and, as I aim to demonstrate 
in the following Part, that notion is also dangerous. It can produce unin-
tended negative consequences for the scheme of humanitarian protections 
in wartime.  
 
V. PERVERSE EFFECTS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
In this Part, I consider some of the consequences of accepting the Moham-
med framework. 
First, the logic of the Court’s analysis potentially undercuts the LOAC 
regime. It introduces incoherence into the system by suggesting that LOAC 
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can bestow an affirmative authority absent domestic law. And it flips the 
relationship between States’ freedom of action in internal conflicts (where 
sovereignty is at its zenith) with States’ freedom of action in international 
armed conflicts. That is, States would be authorized to carry out certain 
actions in international armed conflicts but not internal armed conflicts. 
Second, the Court’s reasoning is based on a premise that detention is, 
in fact, authorized by LOAC, albeit in international armed conflicts. For 
example, the opinion finds authorization in Article 21 of the POW Con-
vention and presumably in the internment provisions of the Civilians Con-
vention. Surely many human rights advocates and organizations would ar-
gue that even in an international conflict, LOAC does not provide the 
source of authority for detention, and that authority must be found in do-
mestic law (or perhaps Security Council resolutions). The Mohammed judg-
ment now stands in their way.  
Third, as part of its reasoning, the Court suggests that no LOAC pro-
cedural protections apply to detention in NIAC.35 On that view, one would 
have to convince warfighters that they should respect the ICCPR and the 
like, not the Geneva Conventions or laws of warfare.36 In many cases that 
would be a difficult proposition (to say the least), and victims of armed 
conflict would pay a price. As a corollary, it would also mean there is no 
war crime of unlawful confinement in NIAC (now or presumably as a matter 
of lex lata in the foreseeable future).  
Fourth, the Court suggests because LOAC does not provide lawful 
grounds for detention of enemy fighters in NIACs, such detention would 
not be permitted through derogation under international human rights law 
either. The Court reasons that a derogation might be acceptable only in the 
case of an express “obligation” for detaining POWs in international armed 
conflict.37 And the Court suggests that any outcome that provides for secu-
rity detentions in NIACs may be anathema to rule-of-law values.38 Thus 
not only would States be unable to detain enemy fighters when invited by a 
host State to help stop a genocidal armed group, but that legal incapacity to 
detain would seemingly apply across all NIACs. Indeed, the Court’s state-
ments suggest that the European Convention on Human Rights would 
                                                                                                                      
35. Mohammed, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 261, 293. 
36. The LOAC prohibition on detention for the purpose of interrogation would also 
not apply in NIACs and the relevant norms would therefore have to be found in IHRL, or 
elsewhere.  
37. Mohammed, supra note 1, at ¶ 284. 












preclude such detentions even if domestic law authorized them. Surely 
States would not accept or respect such an international legal regime.  
Finally, the Court’s limited acceptance of the government’s logic that 
the power to kill includes the power to detain is problematic.39 That logic—
imagine two concentric circles of the power to kill and to detain—applies 
only to members of armed forces and civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities.40 It does not apply to civilians who indirectly participate in hos-
tilities—such as security threats under articles 5, 27, 41–43, and 78 of the 
Civilians Convention. Those individuals are not lawful targets unless they 
directly participate in hostilities. The notion that the greater power includes 
the lesser power thus does not apply to those individuals’ situation. And, in 
Mohammed in particular, it is notable that the PIL Claimants included indi-
viduals who fall into that category.41 I thus do not see the logic in the no-
tion of coextensive detention and targeting authority set forth by Sean 
Aughey and Aurel Sari in the current volume of International Law Studies.42 
We should also worry about potential perverse incentives flowing from 
the logic that the power to kill includes the power to detain. It could en-
courage belligerents to excessively expand the definitional scope of lawful 
targets to justify detention policies. For example, a belligerent might be in-
cented to argue that individuals who are indirect participants in hostilities 
(e.g., financiers) are lawful targets, because that would lawfully permit their 
detention. It is remarkable, for example, that the United Kingdom’s brief 
advances the idea that the power to kill includes the power to detain as 
though that resolves the case, but the government’s own description of at 
least two of the PIL Claimants would surely fall outside those concentric 
                                                                                                                      
39. Mohammed, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 252–53.  
40. Ryan Goodman, The Limits of the Logic that the Power to Kill Includes the Power to De-
tain, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/10485/power-kill-includes-
power-detain-limits/. See also Goodman, supra note 4. 
41. According to the brief on behalf of Public Interest Lawyers, the British Secretary 
of State “stated in correspondence that Mr Nazim was ‘suspected of financial facilitation 
for the insurgency’ [and] that Mr Qasim was ‘suspected of financial crimes and narcotic 
and lethal aid facilitation.’” PIL Claimants’ Memorial, supra note 11, at ¶ 16. 
42. Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: 
Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUD-
IES 60, 104 (2015), available at http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1002&context=ils (“The logic of this argument is impeccable. If the authority to detain 
derives from the authority to kill—on the basis that the right to deprive a person of his life 
must imply the right to inflict the lesser evil to detain him: a maiore ad minus—it follows 













circles. The UK government’s brief states: “There was strong evidence that 
each of the other Claimants had engaged in the insurgency. . . . In the case 
of Messrs Qasim and Nasim, there was strong evidence of substantial in-
volvement in financing the insurgency.”43 Financiers are arguably detainable 
as indirect participants in hostilities, but they are not lawful targets.  
  
* * * 
 
Fundamentally, the important point is that these missteps were avoida-
ble and, more importantly, unnecessary. The Court’s holding in Mohammed 
affirming the First Proposition is decidedly correct and independently justi-






                                                                                                                      
43. Sec. of State for Defence Skeleton Argument, at ¶ 78, Mohammed v. Ministry of 
Defence, [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369, [273]. 
